It implies that people who reject their claims are not being real. I want to be a realist, but I certainly have seen no evidence that any particular race is more likely to commit unscrupulous acts if you control for environment (if that was even possible). It’s a propaganda term, like ‘[my cause] realist.’
Something can be an applause light for some people and be a boo light for others. Look at how “capitalist” and “communist” were used for much of the Cold War. Also, sometimes a word can have content in some circumstances and be an applause light in other contexts. It seems that “realist” may have both issues in play.
The two usages of “real” are slightly different: Race realism is asserting some testable-in-the real-world hypothesis; moral and scientific anti-realism are just arguing about the ontological status of some phenomenon which they otherwise agree about.
I’m not opposed to ever using terms like “realist.” I’m opposed to it as it was used in the main post, where people who agree my views are realists, and people who do not are denialists.
I didn’t interpret the original post that way. “X realist” on this site doesn’t typically mean “person whose views about X are realistic” but rather “person who believes X is a real thing.” In this case, a “race realist” would be someone who believes that there are real, significant differences between races, presumably on a genetic basis. A race anti-realist would be someone who does not believe that. Both of these are categories of positions, into which a variety of different particular viewpoints might fall.
I would expect the implicit opposite of “race realist” to be “race idealist”; i.e. the opposition is roughly between focusing on things as they are, vs. things as they should be.
“Race idealist” sounds so cool to me, I think I’m seriously gonna start using it for self-identification! I’m indeed more interested in how things should be in regards to racial issues, and how we should act to change them, than in the miserable details of our current plight.
(Tangent: Are you a moral anti-realist? If so… how?)
I have been in the past and I still assign a significant (but currently less than 0.5) probability to the proposition. I was actually referring to my stance towards scientific theories, which is heavily influenced by Bas van Fraassen.
What are your moral anti-realist fall back arguments? I ask because I don’t really understand moral anti-realism and would like pointers towards any of the better arguments for it.
Re scientific anti-realism, I’m surprised that van Fraassen’s approach didn’t gain popularity until van Fraassen in 1980; I figured something like it would’ve become the standard position directly following the fall of logical positivism. I don’t understand why it can take decades for certain clearly reasonable, clearly under-represented perspectives to gain any footing in academic philosophy. Is there really a dearth of proponents, or is the Matthew effect very strong, or...? Anyway, Scientific realism seems clearly naive—so I suppose there must arguments in its favor that I’m just not aware of...? Then again I’m really not impressed by the philosophers of mind who make scientific-realist-like arguments, so maybe I shouldn’t expect to like scientifc realist philosophers of science either? (E.g. at first blush I really don’t like the miracle argument.)
If “realism” is just an applause light, then why do people (including me) refer to themselves (non-ironically) as anti-realists (like moral anti-realists or scientific anti-realists)?
Something can be an applause light for some people and be a boo light for others. Look at how “capitalist” and “communist” were used for much of the Cold War. Also, sometimes a word can have content in some circumstances and be an applause light in other contexts. It seems that “realist” may have both issues in play.
The two usages of “real” are slightly different: Race realism is asserting some testable-in-the real-world hypothesis; moral and scientific anti-realism are just arguing about the ontological status of some phenomenon which they otherwise agree about.
I’m not opposed to ever using terms like “realist.” I’m opposed to it as it was used in the main post, where people who agree my views are realists, and people who do not are denialists.
I didn’t interpret the original post that way. “X realist” on this site doesn’t typically mean “person whose views about X are realistic” but rather “person who believes X is a real thing.” In this case, a “race realist” would be someone who believes that there are real, significant differences between races, presumably on a genetic basis. A race anti-realist would be someone who does not believe that. Both of these are categories of positions, into which a variety of different particular viewpoints might fall.
I would expect the implicit opposite of “race realist” to be “race idealist”; i.e. the opposition is roughly between focusing on things as they are, vs. things as they should be.
That’s not what “realist” means in philosophy.
“Race idealist” sounds so cool to me, I think I’m seriously gonna start using it for self-identification! I’m indeed more interested in how things should be in regards to racial issues, and how we should act to change them, than in the miserable details of our current plight.
Still not neutral. Do you think the people who are not “race realists” call themselves “race idealist”?
(Tangent: Are you a moral anti-realist? If so… how?)
I have been in the past and I still assign a significant (but currently less than 0.5) probability to the proposition. I was actually referring to my stance towards scientific theories, which is heavily influenced by Bas van Fraassen.
What are your moral anti-realist fall back arguments? I ask because I don’t really understand moral anti-realism and would like pointers towards any of the better arguments for it.
Re scientific anti-realism, I’m surprised that van Fraassen’s approach didn’t gain popularity until van Fraassen in 1980; I figured something like it would’ve become the standard position directly following the fall of logical positivism. I don’t understand why it can take decades for certain clearly reasonable, clearly under-represented perspectives to gain any footing in academic philosophy. Is there really a dearth of proponents, or is the Matthew effect very strong, or...? Anyway, Scientific realism seems clearly naive—so I suppose there must arguments in its favor that I’m just not aware of...? Then again I’m really not impressed by the philosophers of mind who make scientific-realist-like arguments, so maybe I shouldn’t expect to like scientifc realist philosophers of science either? (E.g. at first blush I really don’t like the miracle argument.)